Cárdenas Castañeda, Leonardo2020-02-062020-02-062019Revista Lasallista de Investigación–Vol. 16 No 1–20191794-4449http://hdl.handle.net/10567/2658InthisarticleIpresentapossiblepolysemythatcanbeobservedamongthedefendersofscientificnaturalism,foralthoughphilosopherssuchasQuine,Dennett,andGieresharetheoriginalspiritofnaturalizedepistemologyunderthedefinitionIwillcall(D1):the success of epistemology depends on how its problems can be reduced or replaced by science,thetreatmentthateachofthesephilosophersoffersofnaturalizedepistemologydepartsfromthisprimitivedefinition,sinceeachoneprivilegescertainapproachesthatwouldnotbeacceptabletoothers,norarethoseapproachesadjustedinthesamewaytowhatD1posits.So,althoughthethreeacceptthethesisthatthenewepistemologymustexcludethemetaphysicaldiscoursethathasdominatedtraditionalepistemologyandsubstituteitforpurelyscientificprojects,thetreatmentthateachoneseparatelygivestothisthesishasimplicationsthatothersupportersofnaturalismwouldfinditindefensible.esAcceso abiertoCorporación Universitaria LasallistaEpistemologíaConductismoCiencia y tecnologíainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAcces