Posada, Jorge GregorioGiraldo Zuluaga, ConradoRengifo-Castañeda, Carlos Adolfo2020-12-102020-12-102016Revista de Investigación Lasallista - Vol. 13 No. 2 - 20161794-4449http://hdl.handle.net/10567/2861This article aims to shows Donald Davidson ́s position concerning the philosophical discussion between realism and anti-realism. For such purpose, this paper is divided into three parts: in the first, in general terms, some considerations about realism and anti-realism are presented, along with certain approaches to naturalism. In the second part, the reasons that lead to anti-realism, according to Davidson, are shown. For him, it is a popular version of the conceptual relativism. Besides, the attempts of some philosophies to avoid skepticism are also shown, as they necessarily lead to anti-realistic positions. Finally, part three describes why, for Davidson, an adequate language theory can question anti-realism, and the simplest and most natural convictions on what is real, survive.esAcceso abiertoCorporación Universitaria LasallistaEpistemologíaFilosofíaOntologíaEscepticismoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAcces