Una posible polisemia en la epistemología naturalizada
Cargando...
Archivos
Fecha
2019
Autores
Título de la revista
ISSN de la revista
Título del volumen
Editor
Corporación Universitaria Lasallista, Editorial Lasallista
Resumen
InthisarticleIpresentapossiblepolysemythatcanbeobservedamongthedefendersofscientificnaturalism,foralthoughphilosopherssuchasQuine,Dennett,andGieresharetheoriginalspiritofnaturalizedepistemologyunderthedefinitionIwillcall(D1):the success of epistemology depends on how its problems can be reduced or replaced by science,thetreatmentthateachofthesephilosophersoffersofnaturalizedepistemologydepartsfromthisprimitivedefinition,sinceeachoneprivilegescertainapproachesthatwouldnotbeacceptabletoothers,norarethoseapproachesadjustedinthesamewaytowhatD1posits.So,althoughthethreeacceptthethesisthatthenewepistemologymustexcludethemetaphysicaldiscoursethathasdominatedtraditionalepistemologyandsubstituteitforpurelyscientificprojects,thetreatmentthateachoneseparatelygivestothisthesishasimplicationsthatothersupportersofnaturalismwouldfinditindefensible.
Descripción
Palabras clave
Corporación Universitaria Lasallista, Epistemología, Conductismo, Ciencia y tecnología
Citación
Revista Lasallista de Investigación–Vol. 16 No 1–2019

